l
 

l

  Immanuel Kant

www.mysticism.nl




This article was written by ©Arthur Brown  badogen@yahoo.com

Immanuel Kant is one of the most famous philosophers of the Enlightenment. He and David Hume represent the two great minds of the eighteenth century. He is well known for his ideal transcendentalism, a phenomenological philosophy that was considered by many to be a safe haven forKant religion from the fatal logical arrows of David Hume. According to this philosophy this world is not 'the deepest reality out there' yet it is not mere illusion either, it is a phenomenon of the innermost reality, the world of the nominal, the thing in itself.

Here we can feel a mystical tone, but was Kant really a mystic? Is this thing in itself just another name for the mystical ultimate reality? Unfortunately, I don’t think so, and I’ll try to explain and support my view here.

In order to illustrate the differences between Kant and a genuine mystical philosophy, I’ll compare and contrast Kant and a philosopher no one can doubt being a mystic, Shankara. I’ll suppose here the reader has a minimum knowledge regarding the philosophies of those two.

The advaita vedanta, or the non-dual interpretation of the Indian Upanishads, is Shankara’s philosophy. It considers this world as illusion, Maya. Only Brahman is real. Time, place and multiplicity are mere nothingness. Only Brahman exists.

Kant would provide similar teachings, the phenomenal world is not real, the twelve axioms are not real, and among them we find time, place and multiplicity. Kant intellectually concluded this, from what he thought to be paradoxical in this world. His arguments about the paradoxical nature of time and place are well known and found elsewhere on the internet, so I will not explain them here to focus on our main concern. Meanwhile, Shankara didn’t conclude that time is illusionary, he felt that. He simply felt a strange state of being, a wired type of consciousness where time is totally transcended. And thus naively concluded that time is illusionary, he didn’t even realize that he concluded anything, his experience was so intense that the illusionary nature of time was self evident. The same can be said for both philosophers regarding place and multiplicity, one concluded, the other felt.

It was just a coincidence that both philosophers reached such identical positions from totally different starting points and different paths. Yet, their positions was not as close at might seem to the first instance, there are such critical differences that would solidly prove their different grounds of reasoning, I’ll explain here some.

Mahayana Buddhism is maybe the only genuine mystical system where the feeling of sacredness is dramatically suppressed, but if we put this exception apart, we can say that any mystic would feel sacredness towards the ultimate reality. Kant, as far as I know, never talked about the nominal world with this sanctifying attitude. To him, the thing in itself was merely a solid philosophical subject.

Mystics believe that one can experience the ultimate reality, via the mystical experience, some call it nirvana, moksha, being one with the Tao, the inner birth of the Christ, the Christ consciousness, the Buddha nature, the spiritual wedding, etc. Although they all stress that the ultimate reality can never be expressed by words, they believe it can be known, or better say it can be felt. The reasons for this alleged ineffability are worth investigation, but that’s not our subject now. Kant however denies any possibility of “knowing” (and not feeling since the nominal world is just an intellectual subject) the nominal world. According to him, our minds were just crafted to see the world this way, the mind has been made to be governed by time, place, etc and it cannot transcend itself to know the thing in itself, it can, however, intellectually conclude the presence of such a thing because it can know that what it knows (time, place, etc) is paradoxical and not real. And thus Kant would strangely agree (and once again for different reasons) that you couldn’t say what the nominal world is, yet you can say what it is not. Just like the lovely Indian “neti neti”.

I know the last paragraph was somehow complicated, but I’d advice you’d reread it now slowly because it represents the crucial difference between Kant and mysticism.

Here is another difference, less complicated but no less important. Almost all mystics (again Mahayana Kantexcepted) would affirm that the ultimate reality is one. Oneness is perhaps the only positive affirmation a mystic attributes (and strongly attributes) to the ultimate reality. Kant yet doesn’t. Since Kant thought that Oneness is also an axiom, thus the thing in itself is neither one nor many. While mystics find  this reality to be “pure oneness” Kant thinks the nominal world transcends even oneness. Finally Kant explicitly deviates from one of the most, if not the most, important tenet of genuine mysticism.

And after all said, let’s forget about the theoretical part. Let’s look to Kant the man, he was definitely a man of ethics, and as far as I can see he didn’t build his philosophy to protect religion, but to protect the ethics of religion. He was too wise to be fooled by religion's fairy tales and omnipotent gods. He was sad to see ethics collapse with religion. And his “Religion in limits of mere reason” clearly shows his non-interested position in religion. But although being a man of ethics, he was not a man of mysticism. He never let a tear of love fall on his cheeks, he never let peace dwell in his soul, and he never let his emotions take him to the dessert of Eckhart’s essential nothingness.

Kant is to be respected as a philosopher who fought for ethics, and as one of the most intellectually advanced men in his century. He definitely deserves to be remembered as a freedom lover and truth seeker, yet not as a mystic.



 



 Immanuel KantKant Dissertation (1770) on the difference between right- and left-handed spatial orientations, Kant patiently worked out the most comprehensive and influential philosophical programme of the modern era. His central thesis,that the possibility of human knowledge presupposes the active participation of the human mind,is deceptively simple, but the details of its application are notoriously complex.

    The monumental Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) (1781,1787 ) fully spells out the conditions for mathematical, scientific, and metaphysical knowledge in its "Transcendental Aesthetic," "Transcendental Analytic," and "Transcendental Dialectic," but Kant found it helpful to offer a less technical exposition of the same themes in the Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können (Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysic) (1783). KantCarefully distinguishing judgments as analytic or synthetic and as a priori or a posteriori, Kant held that the most interesting and useful varieties of human knowledge rely upon synthetic a priori judgments, which are, in turn, possible only when the mind determines the conditions of its own experience. Thus, it is we who impose the forms of space and time upon all possible sensation in mathematics, and it is we who render all experience coherent as scientific knowledge governed by traditional notions of substance and causality by applying the pure concepts of the understanding to all possible experience. But regulative principles of this sort hold only for the world as we know it, and since metaphysical propositions seek a truth beyond all experience, they cannot be established within the bounds of reason.

    Significant applications of these principles are expressed in Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Metaphysical Foundations of the Science of Nature) (1786) and Beantwortung der Frage: Ist es eine Erfahrung, daß wir denken? (On Comprehension and Transcendental Consciousness) (1788-1791). Kant

    Kant's moral philosophy is developed in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals) (1785). From his analysis of the operation of the human will, Kant derived the necessity of a perfectly Kantuniversalizable moral law, expressed in a categorical imperative that must be regarded as binding upon every agent. In the Third Section of the Grounding and in the Kritik der practischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason) (1788), Kant grounded this conception of moral autonomy upon our postulation of god, freedom, and immortality.

    In later life, Kant drew art and science together under the concept of purpose in the Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment) (1790), considered the consequences of transcendental criticism for theology in Die Religion innerhalb die Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone) (1793), stated the fundamental principles for civil discourse in Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? ("What is Enlightenment?" (1784), and made an eloquent plea for international cooperation in Zum ewigen Frieden (Perpetual Peace) (1795).
                                                                                                              Immanuel Kant was born in the East Prussian city of Königsberg, studied at its university, and worked there as a tutor and professor for more than forty years, never travelling more than fifty miles from home. Although his outward life was one of legendary calm and regularity, Kant's intellectual work easily justified his own claim to have effected a Copernican revolution in philosophy. Beginning with his Inaugural






mysticism.nl








gast Sign our guestbook!






MS banner