The French-Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) made ethics
the central point of his philosophical inquiries. He considered ethics
to be the prima philosophia,
the first and foremost central issue of all philosophical
investigation, in spite of the Greek tradition that from the time of
Aristotle onwards had always allotted this first place to
metaphysics. Levinas believed that metaphysics and ethics were in fact
one and the same. In this equation of metaphysics and ethics he wanted
to underscore the Hebraic element in Western thought, though he knew
well that the Greek Socrates also had made endeavors to show the
metaphysics of ethics. But the difference with Socrates is the fact
that Levinian ethics are more rooted in a religious view on life,
while Socrates wanted to show the rationality
of right ethical conduct.
This has brought a number of students of philosophy to believe that
there is a mystical element in the thought of Levinas, precisely
because he wants to transcend rationality as the source of his ethics.
This makes it worthwhile to consider the similarities and the
dissimilarities between the thought of Levinas and mysticism. That way
we may perhaps in the end be able to answer the question whether
Levinas was a mystic or not; whether his thought is mystical or
otherwise indebted to mysticism.
Ethics
To understand Levinas´ thought we must begin with his teacher,
the German Edmund Husserl. Husserl had discovered that all
consciousness is characterized by intentionality.
With intentionality
he meant that consciousness has an innate tendency to objectify all
external objects and all internal and external psychisms. This
objectifying
isn´t done in any random manner. It has a certain purpose built
into it: it aims at making all exteriors fall into the very matrix of
consciousness itself. According to Husserl every act of objectification
is in fact an act of subjectification. Consciousness wants the object
to become an object to me as
a subject. So this will of consciousness
is to equate, to make what is strange familiar, to make the other the
same. All perception, all experiencing, all understanding -all modi
operandi of consciousness- have precisely this intentionality:
they aim
at possessing the outside world in logical terms, to make
psychologically and intellectually mine what seems remote and strange.
Levinas and Jacques Derrida both agree: this intentionality of
consciousness
is a kind of violence. Consciousness wants to conquer the world by
objectifying it. It doesn´t leave be. It takes in, with the
intent of adapting it to its own. The Other must become the Same. So in
the postmodern thought of Derrida this intentionality becomes
problematic. Rationality and (relative) consciousness are dismantled as
having, so to speak, criminal traits. They want to rob existence of the
thing-in-itself. This according to Derrida is the metaphysics of
violence.
This criticism of Husserl is also the starting point of Levinas. He
wants to show that there is a metaphysical element in existence that
always remains totally strange to me. This element defies all
objectification of consciousness. It can never be expressed in the
classical Greek language of logical thinking. Because of its total
strangeness it escapes me. It can never be pinned down. But
nevertheless it makes an appeal. It wants itself to be heard, though it
can never be understood. According to Levinas this strange other is the
voice of ethics itself. It is the goodness of existence that confronts
me, shakes me, disturbs me and drags me away from my self preoccupation
and self complacency. It can never be subdued because it will always
remain the remote and infinite other.
This voice of the eternal other comes to me, as a religious imperative,
by way of the countenance of
my fellow human being. As an individual I
am an autonomous being striving to prolong my own enjoyment by way of
consumption, housing, work and the accumulation of property. In these
aspects I can shape my own life and I´m free to do as I want. My
aim is to bring everything in life to fit the rules that I have set up.
But there is something mysterious in the countenance of the other that
upsets me and turns my autonomy into an heteronomy. When confronted
with the other I loose my freedom. I become responsible for his well
being. I cannot escape the claim of ethics in taking care of my fellow
human being. The other confronts me with the fact that I will never be
able to secure my life on my own. Somehow life needs otherness also.
At the metaphysical-ethical level of existence I can never escape the
otherness of the countenance and its appeal. The mysteriousness of that
individual other keeps upsetting me. I can not reduce that countenance
in front of me to a class or a category. But at an ontological level
-ie. within an ontology of immanence- the other becomes reduced to an
impersonal class and is fitted into the totalitarian scheme of
categorization. He is reduced from a
being to being. He becomes part of
a greater field and so loses his compelling uniqueness. Instead of that
countenance in front of me he becomes simply a nigger, a gypsy, a Jew.
At this ontological level violence again is possible. Because the other
is robbed of his unique otherness.
The ethical relationship is asymmetrical. The ethical obligation I feel
for the other is far greater than the claims I may have on him. Levinas
speaks in this respect in almost religious language: the other comes to
me ´from above´, he ´descends on me´, like God
spoke from the heights of mount Sinai to his people. The countenance of the other is far greater than me,
because my own self is always the exception. I may try to picture the
other as a self too, but I never succeed in doing so. The self of the
other always remains enigmatic, escaping all objectification of
consciousness. I am never able to see the other as she or he really is.
This makes my small, relatively familiar `I` the exception in a world
of silent, hidden and mysterious selves.
So the essence of ethics is metaphysical. Ethics descends on me from a
hidden, supranatural world of otherness. But a posterior, after the
instigations of an ethical appeal have descended on me, an element of
comparison, an element of rationalization presents itself. Then I start
to think about the right way
to act. Then justice wants some questions
to be answered. I will have to make some -often difficult- choices.
This is the problem of justice, because there is always a third who
makes the ethical relationship with my fellow human being more
complicated. Who should I help first? Who should I help more? Why? This
problem would not be there if there wasn´t a third. The third
impels us to think.
Criticism
This is a nutshell the philosophy of Levinas. The aim of this article
is to compare this philosophy with the insights of mysticism. So it is
best to start this criticism now. Later on some other points in the
ethics of Levinas will be addressed, but they will be presented in the
course of argumentation.
The most fundamental difference between mysticism and Levinas is the
axiom of mysticism that the otherness of the other is just an illusion.
At a fundamental level I and the other are the same. We have the same
divine substantia. We all share the same Self with a capital. When I
look the other in the eye and when the other looks at me, we recognize
ourselves in our eyes. We love and respect each other, because we are
basically the same. This is not a metaphor meaning ´we are all in
it together´ or ´we are put up with each other´, no,
this is very literally so: my deepest `I´ is no different from
your deepest `I´.
Schopenhauer also has pointed to the fact that all ethics are based on
this mutual recognition of sameness. When I see someone on the verge of
drowning, I will not hesitate a second. Even before I have given it any
thought, I will have undone my trousers to get into the water. The help
I will give my fellow human being in such distress is not provoked by
mental considerations. The instigation to act immediately is premental.
It comes from the metaphysical level of Self, from our shared
godliness. Before I have thought about, it flashes through my heart
-not through my mind-: 'there is ´me´ lying in the water! I
have to save ´me´'.
In these premental, ethical and instinctive feelings I equate the life
of that illusionary ´other´ with my own life. My respect
for the life of others -and in fact for all life- comes from the fact
that my deepest and true Self and the Self of that submergent other
over there in the water are nothing more and nothing less than Life
itself. Life recognizes Life. Forces are joined and ranks are closed.
In these decisive moments of great danger and distress all otherness
-which was an illusion anyhow- falls away. Man can only be so good and so
brave because he is in fact saving ´himself´, when he is
saving others. But remember, the ethics of help and braveness are
premental: ´why did you do it, risking your own life?´
´I don´t know. I simply acted.`
If the other would be a total -even a metaphysically total, as Levinas
would have it- stranger to me, it would leave me stone cold. I would
shrug, walk away and think the old testamentian ´am I my
brother´s keeper?` The strangeness of the other would prevent me
from having any inner connection. But as it is, in respect, love and
all ethics I leave aside the otherness of the other and focus on what
we have in common, which is not simply an attribute (which would be an
indifferens, in Stoic terms),
but which is our deepest substantia.
It is precisely as Levinas describes: the other is holy to me, he has a
greater claim on me than I have on him, he comes to me ´from
above´ etc. But it is so for reasons that are precisely contrary
to the arguments Levinas presents. The otherness of the other is not an
epiphany of the sacred. It is an epiphenomenon of the sacred; merely an
illusion that is set aside on decisive and deeply felt moments of being
touched by the other. The other moves my heart, because she is the God
that I actually am. This feeling strikes me, moves me, upsets me and
makes me wonder about Who I actually am. This is the source of all
ethics: the thunderbolt strikes me that I am actually the other and the
other is actually me.
Levinas is right that there is otherness in the other. But his
otherness is the same as my own otherness is to me. He is as other to
me as I am other to myself. For the otherness of the other is only at
the level of personality and ego. At this level I am also other to
mySelf. If I identify myself with this level -the wrong assumption that
I am so and so and this and that- I also become estranged to myself. I
will then be other than myself, an idea not very accurately analyzed
within the phenomenology of Husserl nor within the ethics of Levinas,
but which is one of the basic insights of mysticism. When I am other
than myself, I will also become other to the other. He will not
recognize me anymore. If I build up a too strong personalty he will in
fact mock me for it, disrespect me for it, aye, even hate me for it.
Then the Levinian metaphysicality of all ethics is lost between the
other and me.
The mystics also speak of the countenance of the other, but for them it
is the mask, the persona,
that hides the true essence of the other.
That´s why the mystics close their eyes and look for the Original
Face -both of the self and the other-, ie. the countenance we have
before we were born, which is our true identity if only we would
somehow manage to strip ourself of the so and so, the this and that and
the then and then. So it is not the countenance of the other that stirs
me. It is the eyes of the
other that make the appeal, because the eyes
reflect our deepest soul. That´s why we never look another in the
eyes when we humiliate or violate each other. If I would look the other
in the eyes I would only see myself. This would refrain me from any
violation.
But the countenance is the mask, the persona, the hypocrite, the stage
player. I use my countenance to play my role and hide the real me that
I am. One can easily check this with a little experiment. All it takes
is to take a mirror and hold it before our face. Within a few seconds
we will be ´making faces´ and mimicking to the mirror.
Instantaneously the role playing begins. I will play the sad person, or
the smiling person, or the person in need etc. We do this all the time,
when we meet people. Thus the face is very cleverly trained in serving
our needs of the moment. What the personality wants, the face reflects.
But the eyes never lie. For Levinas the countenance reflects the
countenance of God, after who´s image we are made. But only the
eyes do so in fact, the countenance never. For the eyes reflect the
divine Self which is the true center of every being. And right away,
prementally, it shivers and moves in my soul: `it is Me that I see
there in the eyes before me!´ But only because I am able, by
looking deep into the eyes, to lift up the mask and see behind any
countenance the other is showing.
Synchronicity and
diachronicity
The assumption of the fundamental otherness of the other reveals a deep
inner contradiction within the philosophy of Levinas. To make this
clear we shall have to describe two philosophical terms Levinas uses in
explaining the workings of consciousness and time: synchronicity
My consciousness collects all sorts of sense impressions, together with
the thoughts, feelings, and memories that I have, to bring them
together at a single point in time: at this present moment at which I
am conscious. Relative consciousness ´sucks in´ the past,
the present and the future, so to speak. It does so to give an overall
view of my life and its surroundings. Its purpose is to give meaning to
every object that is (re)presented. This is the synchronicity of
consciousness. Its working is a
presence in the here and now. It
condenses all time to this nunctuous point of synchronicity. Its
function is to shed light on everything that has happened, happens and
will happen, but it can only do so at some present moment. I may move
the beam of light backwards to the past or forwards to the future, but
the projecting of the light and the projector of the light are only at
the synchronic level of a nunctuous moment.
diachronicity
So consciousness works at a synchronic level. But my life and my
relative existence are located in time. Living as an organism I am in
the claws of time. The fleeting of time tends to escape the control of
my consciousness. Time has a life of its own. It devours me. In the end
it will even annihilate me and my consciousness. Then I will again have
fallen into the dark abyss of time. This is diachronic time, the time
outside of my consciousness. My consciousness aims at shedding light on
this diachronic time to give some meaning to it all, but it only
succeeds incompletely and piecemeal.
So in the existential philosophy of Levinas the world of light is only
the world of
our consciousness. The world of light is only at the synchronic level.
But outside of this world of light there is the world of diachronic
time. This world escapes me. So it is a world of darkness, a world of
meaninglessness. I am its victim. The existence of this world confronts
me when the synthesizing capacity of my consciousness has failed me,
like in the hours of sleeplessness, in suffering or in the ultimate
unsatisfactoriness of erotic pleasure. Levinas calls this world the `il
y a`, the ´there is...` of diachronic time.
Now the great problem within the philosophy of Levinas is: the other
must belong to the dark world of ´il y a´, precisely
because he is essentially other than my consciousness. He escapes the
light of my consciousness. He always remains the Other. He can never
totally be reduced to the synchronic world of the Same. Would this be
so, he would not, in Levinian terms, escape the ´violence´
of my consciousness. He would be reduced to the me. This reduction
would show my lack of respect and my hunger for control. The other
remains outside of my devouring consciousness in the diachronic world
of time. According to Levinas, it is precisely because of this
otherness, because of his being outside my synchronicity, that he can
make his ethical appeal.
But the problem is: the world of ´il y a´ is a world of
meaninglessness, of darkness, not the world of light. If the other belongs to
this world of ´il y a´ he would be also meaningless to me.
I would not have any connection with him whatsoever, but he would haunt
my sleepless nights as a source of ignorance, fear and resentment. My
consciousness would not be able to locate him in synchronic time. He
would literally be a total stranger to my world. In short: his ethical
appeal would be meaningless and therefor refused.
Levinas proposed a solution to this problem that has some resemblances
with mysticism. He said that not all of the other belonged to the dark
world of immanent being, the diachronic world of ´il y a´.
The ethical element in my
meeting with the other belonged to a world
beyond immanent being. He called this the transcendent world of
´other-than-being´, autrement
qu`être. All goodness, all
ethics come from this other world that is beyond the being of this
world.
The mystics would nod and assent to this solution, but not
wholeheartedly. There would still remain qualms and doubts about this
solution. For they would say that precisely this belonging to the world
of ´autrement qu´être´ makes us ethically the
same.
It takes away all otherness of the other. It is not the Other that is
the source of all goodness in the world, it is the Same. So the
difference between mysticism and Levinas comes down to the problem of
the One and the Many. So let´s see what the mystics have to say
about sameness and otherness.
the metaphysics of
mysticism
The existentialism of Levinas accords consciousness only a place within
me. So consciousness in the books of Levinas is always a
relative
consciousness. But in mysticism my consciousness is part of (or more
correctly: overlaps with) a larger kosmic consciousness, called Pure or
Absolute Consciousness. So in mysticism the beam of light is not only
within me, but it is everywhere in the kosmos. This is the
misconception that I have to liberate myself from, that I would be the
sole keeper of the beam of light. Like Plato said, at a transcendent
level we are all inhabitants of a world of light. The only thing I have
to do is to transcend this world of immanence. In this transcendence I
will find the meaning I am looking for.
In religious language: I will have to find God to find meaning. Levinas
would assent to this transcendence, but the unsurmountable difference
with mysticism is his description of the complete Otherness of God. In
mysticism we believe that God and the deepest Me are one and the same.
But suppose Levinas would retort: ´with the complete Otherness of
the ´autrement qu´être´, of the other and of
God I
mean that they always remain different from and strange to my personal
me. Is this not an insight of mysticism also, that the form and
the
personal are merely an illusion? What else does the word
´illusion´ mean than that it is other than Reality? Does
this not mean that the substratum and the epiphenomenon of form are
incompatible? I do not see any fundamental difference between my
philosophy and the philosophy of mysticism.`
But I think this is a wrong explanation of the metaphysics of
mysticism. For in mysticism the One and the Many are ontologically
different -and here Levinas is right- but they also share the same
metaphysics, which means that both the One and the Many share the same
godliness. The One is in the Many and the Many are in the One. This is
the great mystical paradox: ´This world is illusionary. Only
Brahman is real. The world is Brahman´.
So God is never a
stranger to me. Not even to my personal me. He is not the completely
Other. He is the fundamentally Same.
In mysticism we transcend all duality, also the duality man versus God.
But in the Hebraic thought of Levinas God remains so holy and
inapproachable that He always remains the completely Other. The duality
is not transcended, but strengthened instead. I think this
misconception stems from a wrong understanding of the nature of
divinity. For it is true that the deepest godliness of myself, of the
other, of all existence always remains to a certain degree
unknown and unknowable to me. But we
must not confuse this
unknowability of God with a complete otherness of God. That
something
is unknown or not known yet does not mean that it is other. This is
jumping to conclusions.
If God or my fellow human being were completely other than me, I would
not have any rapport with them nor with that other world that is beyond
immanent being and its beings, but that is my true home. In mysticism
this rapport is felt so strongly because all differences between this
so called me and this so called other are in fact illusionary. But
let´s not stress the argument too much, because the point is made.
Similarities between
Levinian thought and mysticism
The mystical element in the thought of Levinas is his analysis of the
´autrement qu´être´ as mainly ethical. His
´autrement´ is the source of all quality and goodness in
the world. Mysticism agrees on this. Whether we believe in an
unsurmountable duality between God and the world -as Levinas does- or
whether we believe that godliness is the essential element of all life
-as mysticism does-, we both believe that quality, happiness and
goodness depend on some sort of transcendence. The being moved, the
being touched, the friendly smile, the arm around the shoulder, in
short, compassion, friendliness and altruistic behavior all have their
roots in a mysterious component of life, that is the source as well as
the telos of all existence.
Levinas and mysticism also agree on the fact that there is infinity and
that this fact leads to a fundamental unknowability of the world. When
our thought tries to capture this infinity within the finity of its own
paradigmata, it behaves in a violent and totalitarian way. It wants to
shrink the infinity and the forever newness of the world to fit its own
views and claims. This is for Levinas and also for mysticism the
ultimate hybris. This brought
him to believe that the intentionality of
our relative consciousness and its seeking for truth within a mental
paradigma have to be transcended. Here Levinas and Zen have much in
common. Like Zen, Levinas also wants to break out to a level of
no-mind. But for Levinas this outbreak is mainly an ethical one. I can
only break out in the ethical relationship I have with the other. In
the confrontation with the other I am forced by God to break out. So
for Levinas the other is the ultimate meditation in life.
onwards had always allotted this first place to
metaphysics. Levinas believed that metaphysics and ethics were in fact
one and the same. In this equation of metaphysics and ethics he wanted
to underscore the Hebraic element in Western thought, though he knew
well that the Greek Socrates also had made endeavors to show the
metaphysics of ethics. But the difference with Socrates is the fact
that Levinian ethics are more rooted in a religious view on life,
while Socrates wanted to show the rationality
of right ethical conduct.
consciousness has an innate tendency to objectify all
external objects and all internal and external psychisms. This
objectifying
isn´t done in any random manner. It has a certain purpose built
into it: it aims at making all exteriors fall into the very matrix of
consciousness itself. According to Husserl every act of objectification
is in fact an act of subjectification. Consciousness wants the object
to become an object to me as
a subject. So this will of consciousness
is to equate, to make what is strange familiar, to make the other the
same. All perception, all experiencing, all understanding -all modi
operandi of consciousness- have precisely this intentionality:
they aim
at possessing the outside world in logical terms, to make
psychologically and intellectually mine what seems remote and strange.
The countenance of the other is far greater than me,
because my own self is always the exception. I may try to picture the
other as a self too, but I never succeed in doing so. The self of the
other always remains enigmatic, escaping all objectification of
consciousness. I am never able to see the other as she or he really is.
This makes my small, relatively familiar `I` the exception in a world
of silent, hidden and mysterious selves.
Man can only be so good and so
brave because he is in fact saving ´himself´, when he is
saving others. But remember, the ethics of help and braveness are
premental: ´why did you do it, risking your own life?´
´I don´t know. I simply acted.` 
and mimicking to the mirror.
Instantaneously the role playing begins. I will play the sad person, or
the smiling person, or the person in need etc. We do this all the time,
when we meet people. Thus the face is very cleverly trained in serving
our needs of the moment. What the personality wants, the face reflects.
light. If the other belongs to
this world of ´il y a´ he would be also meaningless to me.
I would not have any connection with him whatsoever, but he would haunt
my sleepless nights as a source of ignorance, fear and resentment. My
consciousness would not be able to locate him in synchronic time. He
would literally be a total stranger to my world. In short: his ethical
appeal would be meaningless and therefor refused.
of all existence always remains to a certain degree
unknown and unknowable to me. But we
must not confuse this
unknowability of God with a complete otherness of God. That
something
is unknown or not known yet does not mean that it is other. This is
jumping to conclusions.
